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I. INTRODUCTION
Some forty years ago, a leading land use scholar noted that "it has
always been recognized that it is an essential part of the judicial
function to watch over the parochial and exclusionist attitudes and
policies of local governments, and to see to it that these do not run
counter to national policy and the general welfare."1 Maine courts
by and large have discharged this judicial function by consistently
striking down unauthorized and overreaching local governmental
land use decisions.' The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as
the Law Court, issued a stern warning over twenty years ago in Bar-
nard v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Yarmouth:3
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.S., 1960, University of
Utah; M.S., 1963, J.D., 1966, University of Wisconsin. The Author expresses
appreciation to the University of Maine School of Law Summer Research Stipend
Program for its assistance in the preparation of this Article.
** Candidate for J.D., 1996, University of Maine School of Law; A.B., 1990,
Duke University.
1. Norman Williams, Jr., Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAw & CON.
TEMP. PROBS. 317,318 (1955). Justice Hall of the New Jersey Supreme Court quoted
this passage in his dissenting opinion in Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester
Township, 181 A.2d 129, 141 (NJ. 1962) (Hall, J., dissenting). In Vickers the major-
ity upheld a zoning ordinance amendment that barred the construction of mobile
home parks throughout the municipality. Id. at 140. Over a decade later Justice Hall
authored the majority opinion in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975), an oft-cited decision invalidating a sys-
tem of land use regulation that made providing low and moderate income housing
within Township boundaries virtually impossible. Id. at 729-30. The Mount Laurel
majority concluded that municipalities have a presumptive obligation to provide an
opportunity for a variety of housing, including low and moderate cost housing,
through their land use regulations. Id. at 728.
2. See Orlando E. Delogu, A Final Note on The Misuse of Land Use Control
Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. REv.
311 n.3 (1980) (citing numerous decisions of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
warning municipalities about exclusion or invalidating exclusionary land use control
measures).
3. 313 A.2d 741 (Me. 1974).
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[W]e are mindful that zoning has been used frequently for
ends which while ostensibly within the traditional objectives of
zoning-protection of health, safety, morals and general wel-
fare-are in fact unrelated to those purposes.
Recognizing this potential for abuse inhering in the zoning
power, both federal and state courts have in recent years or-
dered modifications in zoning plans on equal protection and
due process grounds.4
Developing this principle, a line of cases beginning with Waterville
Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals,I and including Cope v. In-
habitants of Brunswick6 and Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth,7 exem-
plifies the type of modifications ordered by courts to address
constitutional infirmities in land use ordinances. Within this line of
cases the Law Court has articulated and reiterated the proposition
that delegations of decision-making power must contain adequate,
legislatively-fashioned standards to be constitutionally permissible.'
The Waterville Hotel court tersely noted:
4. Id. at 745. See also Grondin v. Inhabitants of Eliot, Civil "975-A (Me. Super.
Ct., Yor. Cty., Apr. 30, 1969) (Webber, J.). In Grondin the Town of Eliot enacted an
ordinance prohibiting trailers and mobile homes within town boundaries. In adjudi-
cating the validity of the ordinance, the court observed that the legislature had
granted to municipalities the power to adopt "reasonable regulations ... designed to
promote the public 'health, safety and general welfare.'" Id. at 1-2 (citing ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2151). The court then noted that "[n]othing contained (within
the statute] even remotely suggests that a municipality is empowered to exclude all
trailers and mobile homes from any and every location therein.... [Ilt was beyond
the scope of the authority of the Town of Eliot to adopt this ordinance." Id. at 2.
5. 241 A.2d 50 (Me. 1968).
6. 464 A.2d 223 (Me. 1983).
7. 523 A.2d 575 (Me. 1987).
8. Other cases within the Waterville Hotel, Cope. Wakelin line include: Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 260 A.2d 434, 435 (Me. 1970) (observing
that the lack of specific guidelines in a zoning ordinance that allows the Zoning
Board of Appeals to deny a conditional use permit where the -building andior use
[would be] detrimental or injurious to the neighborhood" encourages discriminatory
action by the Board); Stucki v. Plavin, 291 A.2d 508 (Me. 1972) (holding invalid a
zoning ordinance bestowing unlimited discretion upon the Board of Zoning Appeals
to approve the extension of regulations applicable to a less restrictive portion of a
parcel into a more restricted area where the zoning district boundary line divides the
parcel); Town of Windham v. LaPointe, 308 A.2d 286 (Me. 1973) (striking down a
municipal ordinance for failure to provide sufficient standards where the ordinance
forbids the establishment of house trailer parks without the approval of the
Selectmen and Planning Board); Fitanides v. Crowley, 467 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1983)
(holding unconstitutional for failure to provide adequate standards a zoning ordi-
nance authorizing the Board of Zoning Appeals to deny a special exception permit
for the construction of a campground where the use would not promote "the public
health, safety, welfare, moral order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity,
or general welfare"); Chandler v. Town of Pittsfield, 496 A.2d 1058 (Me. 1985) (in-
validating a provision in a zoning ordinance directing the Planning Board and Board
of Appeals to evaluate a variety of detailed factors in considering a special exception
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The legislative body [City Council] may specify conditions
under which certain uses may exist and may delegate to the
Board [of Zoning Appeals] discretion in determining whether
or not the conditions have been met. The legislative body can-
not, however, delegate to the Board a discretion which is not
limited by legislative standards. It cannot give the Board dis-
cretionary authority to approve or disapprove applications for
permits as the Board thinks -best serves the public interest
without establishing standards to limit and guide the Board.9
In Cope the court said, "The delegation is improper if the Board is
permitted to decide ... without specific guidelines.., what unique
or distinctive characteristics of a particular apartment building will
render it detrimental or injurious to the neighborhood."'" In Wake-
permit without providing guidance as to the weight or effect to be attached to each
factor).
9. Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 241 A.2d at 52. The land-
owner in Waterville Hotel applied.for a permit to construct a filling station on prop-
erty located within a commercial zoning district. Id. at 50. The ordinance stated that
"'all major changes of uses of land, buildings or structures in this [commercial] zone
shall be subject to the approval of the Board of Zoning Appeals.' " Id. at 51 (quot-
ing Waterville, Me., Zoning Ordinance § IV-G). The Board denied the landowner's
application upon a finding that the proposed use would create a traffic hazard. Id.
The court observed that the ordinance failed to provide any standards to limit and
guide the Board in issuing permits. Id. at 53. Not only did the lack of standards
raise equal protection and due process questions, but it also constituted an improper
and unconstitutional delegation of power to the Board. Id. at 52-54. The court
therefore invalidated the ordinance. Id. at 54.
10. Cope v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 464 A.2d at 227 (emphasis added). In
Cope the Zoning Board of Appeals denied developers a special exception permit to
build several multi-unit apartment buildings. Id. at 224-25. (Note that "[t]he terms
'special exception' and 'conditional use' are used interchangeably. Special excep-
tions are considered by the legislative body to be essentially desirable uses, but uses
that by their nature create special problems which require the imposition of restric-
tions or conditions." Chandler v. Town of Pittsfield, 496 A.2d 1058. 1060-61 (Me.
1985)). The superior court affirmed the permit denial, and the developers appealed
to the Law Court. The Law Court held that the zoning ordinance was an improper
delegation of legislative authority to the Board and was therefore unconstitutional
on its face. Cope v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 464 A.2d at 225, 227. The ordinance
directed the Board to deny a permit application where the proposed use would
"'adversely affect the health, safety, or general welfare of the public'" or where it
would "'alter the essential characteristics of the surrounding property.'" Id. at 224-
25 (quoting Brunswick, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 1107(2), (4)). The court explained
that "[tlhose standards refer only to the same general considerations which the legis-
lative body was required to address and resolve in enacting the ordinance." Id. at
227. It is the responsibility of the Board in granting special exception permits to
determine whether a specific location is unsuitable for a proposed use because of
unique characteristics that render the legislative determination of general suitability
inapplicable. Id. In making this determination the Board should not have unfet-
tered discretion but instead must be guided by specific standards within the ordi-
nance. Ia. An ordinance that allows the Board to decide whether certain uses are
generally compatible with a zone allows the Board to decide the legislative question
anew and is therefore improper. Id. The court in Cope recognized, as it did in Wa-
terville Hotel, that the failure to provide adequate standards within a zoning ordi-
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lin, a case in which the town's ordinance lamely attempted to fash-
ion standards, the Law Court found the standards unconstitutionally
vague." There was no basis upon which the critical terms "intensity
of use ... and density of development"' 2 could be defined and ap-
plied. The court observed:
Absent specific standards giving content to the term "intensity
of use," whether that term means "two persons per acre" or
"twenty persons per acre," or something else entirely, is a mat-
ter of conjecture. Similarly, absent specific standards giving
content to the term "density of development," whether that
term signifies a ratio of built-upon acreage to unbuilt-upon
acreage, or the number of structures on a particular lot, or
something else entirely, is also a matter of conjecture ...
Such uncertainty is impermissible.1 3
Several recent cases, however, cast doubt on the Law Court's con-
tinuing commitment to guard against the parochial instincts of local
land use decision-makers.' 4 There is speculation as to whether the
Waterville Hotel line of cases retains the vitality it once had. It is the
purpose of this Article to show the utility of, and the underlying
legal theories that support, these twenty-five years of case law. The
Authors will argue that both public and private interests, as well as
fundamental principles of "ordered government," are best served by
a strong and substantive reaffirmation of the principles and lessons
of Waterville Hotel, Cope, and Wakelin. In the area of land use, judi-
cial watchfulness over the parochial instincts of local governments is
needed today no less than it was more than twenty-five years ago
when the warnings were first sounded.
nance raises equal protection, due process, and separation of powers issues. Id. at
225-26.
11. Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d at 577. The landowner in Wakelin
applied to the Zoning Board of Appeals for a special exception permit to install
three apartments within his barn. Id. at 576. The ordinance required that the " 'pro-
posed use... be compatible with existing uses in the neighborhood, with respect to
physical size, visual impact, intensity of use, proximity to other structures and den-
sity of development.'" Id. (quoting Yarmouth. Me., Zoning Ordinance art. VII.
§ 101.4(4)(e)). The Board denied the request because the proposed use did not sat-
isfy the "intensity of use" and "density of development" requirements. Id. at 576-77.
The court held the ordinance unconstitutional because the two standards were insuf-
ficient to guide the Board in determining whether the proposed use was compatible
with existing uses in the neighborhood. Id. at 577.
12. Id at 576 (quoting Yarmouth, Me., Zoning Ordinance art. VII, § 101.4(4)(e)).
13. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
14. See infra part III (discussing the dissenting opinion in Bass v. Town of Wilton,
512 A.2d 309, 311 (Me. 1986) (Scolnik, J., dissenting), and the majority opinions in
McCallum v. City of Biddeford, 551 A.2d 452 (Me. 1988), Lentine v. Town of St.
George, 599 A.2d 76 (Me. 1991), Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d 898
(Me. 1993), and Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A2d 619 (Me. 1994)).
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II. LEGAL THEORIES UNDERLYING A "MEANINGFUL"
STANDARDS REQUIREMENT
The first and perhaps the most obvious reason for a "meaningful"
standards requirement, when decision-making power is delegated by
a legislative body to executive or administrative officers of govern-
ment, is that basic "separation of powers" principles require it. The
Cope court reminded us that "local zoning boards... have no inher-
ent authority to regulate the use of private property."' 5 What
power they have is delegated, and the delegation is sustainable only
when accompanied by defining and limiting standards fashioned by
the legislative delegator. As the Law Court noted in Stucki v.
Plavin:'6
The governing rule, constitutionally mandated, may be sim-
ply stated as that in delegating power to an administrative
agency, the legislative body must spell out its policies in suffi-
cient detail to furnish a guide which will enable those to whom
the law is to be applied to reasonably determine their rights
thereunder, and so that the determination of those rights will
not be left to the purely arbitrary discretion of the
administrator.17
The Stucki court cited Waterville Hotel."8 Cope in turn cited both of
these decisions,' 9 and others in the line of cases previously noted,20
to sustain the fundamental principle that administrative bodies
(planning boards and zoning boards of appeal) do not make law,
they merely carry out the law pursuant to delegations of power ap-
propriately bounded by the aforementioned, and absolutely neces-
sary, standards.
A second rationale or legal theory underlying the "meaningful"
standards requirement is the duty under both the federal and Maine
Constitutions to afford property owners, developers, and applicants
under all land use control laws "equal protection" or equal treat-
ment under the law. Almost all of the decisions in the noted twenty-
five year line of cases elaborate on this point. For example, the Wa-
terville Hotel court stated:
The reasons for requiring that standards be prescribed can
clearly be seen. While the plaintiff's use of its land is subject
to reasonable regulation by the City in the exercise of its po-
lice power, such regulation must be in accordance with a
15. Cope v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223, 225 (Me. 1983).
16. 291 A.2d 508 (Me. 1972).
17. I& at 510.
18. Id at 510-11.
19. Cope v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 464 A.2d at 225-27.
20. Id. (citing Town of Windham v. LaPointe, 308 A.2d 286 (Me. 1973), and Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 260 A.2d 434 (Me. 1970)). See supra
note 8.
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proper rule or standard which must be applied alike to all per-
sons similarly situated.2'
The court then quoted approvingly from a Michigan case,22 "With-
out definite standards an ordinance becomes an open door to favor-
itism and discrimination, a ready tool for the suppression of
competition through the granting of authority to one and the with-
holding from another."' This is equal protection language, reason-
ing, and analysis. The Wakelin court was even more succinct, "[Tlhe
absence of specific standards in zoning ordinances results in a denial
of equal protection of the laws to the property owner .... ,24 Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals,' Town of Windham
v. LaPointe,'6 and Cope all contain similar reasoning as part of the
basis for the court's holdings.27 In short, these cases hold that the
absence of "meaningful" standards in land use control ordinances
invites, if it does not in fact produce, unequal treatment. The ordi-
nances are thus unconstitutional.
A third rationale for requiring "meaningful" standards is found in
the concept of "due process," which encompasses those rights and
protections that must be afforded all property owners or developers
in their dealings with governmental bodies and regulatory con-
trols.2 Aside from the right to a hearing and to have their applica-
tions for development processed in an orderly and timely fashion,2 9
developers, within the concept of due process, are entitled to know
with reasonable clarity what they must do to obtain under state or
local land use control laws the permits or approvals they seek. In
21. Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals. 241 A.2d 50. 53 (Me.
1968).
22. Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 75 N.W.2d 25 (Mich. 1956).
23. Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals. 241 A2d at 53 (quoting
Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 75 N.W.2d at 28).
24. Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575. 577 (Me. 1987).
25. 260 A.2d 434 (Me. 1970).
26. 308 A.2d 286 (Me. 1973).
27. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals. 260 A.2d at 435 ("The
danger is that broad policy statements unaccompanied by any specific standards vill
not effectively curtail the power to discriminate."); Town of Windham v. LaPointe,
308 A.2d at 293 ("The ordinance delegates to the Selectmen and the Planning Board
an unbridled discretion in their decision, thus clothing such agencies with an uncon-
stitutional power to discriminate in its enforcement."); Cope v. Inhabitants of Tovn
of Brunswick, 464 A.2d at 226 ("Such broad delegation of power breeds selectivity
in the enforcement of the law. When no standards are provided to guide the discre-
tion of the enforcement authority, the fact that the law might be applied in a dis-
criminatory manner settles its constitutionality." (quoting Town of Windham v.
LaPointe, 308 A2d at 293)).
28. See Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARv. L
REv. 77, 77 (1948-1949) (due process requirements of definiteness in legislative en-
actments serve to guide the judge in adjudicating rights and duties, and the individ-
ual in planning his or her future conduct).
29. Cf Randall v. Patch, 118 Me. 303, 305, 108 A. 97, 98 (1919) ("Notice and
opportunity for hearing are of the essence of due process of law.").
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other words, "meaningful" standards help avoid the fatal due pro-
cess defect of vagueness.3" Maine's highest court has noted that "[a]
statute is void for vagueness when it sets guidelines which would
force men of general intelligence to guess at its meaning, leaving
them without assurance that their behavior complies with legal re-
quirements and forcing courts to be uncertain in their interpretation
of the law.",31 Waterville Hotel, Stucki, Cope, and Wakelin all rein-
force this point. Portions of the critical language in Wakelin and
Stucki pertaining to vagueness have already been cited.32 In striking
down the vague standards of the Yarmouth Zoning Ordinance, the
Wakelin court also noted, "From the ordinance an applicant cannot
even tell whether compatibility with his project's surroundings re-
quires the same intensity of use and density of development, or less,
or more."33 This uncertainty violates the due process rights of the
landowner and as such is constitutionally impermissible, as the court
held.34 The Waterville Hotel court, quoting approvingly from a Wis-
consin case, stated:
Standards were needed ... not only to guide the board but
also to inform ... [the applicant] and any other parties hoping
to build filling stations of what was required of them and what
factors were to be considered by the board in disposing of
each application for a filling station permit.35
The court then observed, "The failure to spell out standards reduces
the property owner to a state of total uncertainty and amounts to
depriving him of the use of his property., 36 Vagueness, uncertainty
as to meaning, and uncertainty as to how to fashion an approvable
application, all brought about by the absence of "meaningful" stan-
dards, violate the due process rights of property owners.
In sum, the justification for a "meaningful" standards requirement
arises on any one of several grounds: separation of powers, equal
protection, or due process. These supporting rationale, though sep-
arated here for discussion purposes, are often intertwined. The
Maine cases cited evidence this fact. The Wakelin court, for exam-
ple, after stating that the absence of specific standards denies equal
30. See infra text accompanying note 101.
31. Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective Ass'n,
320 A.2d 247, 253 (Me. 1974).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 13 and 17.
33. Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575, 577 (Me. 1987).
34. Id ("The determinative issue ... is whether the terms 'intensity of use' and
'density of development' are sufficiently specific standards to guide both an appli-
cant in presenting his case... and the Board in examining the proposed use .... We
conclude that they do not come up to the level of specificity required to pass consti-
tutional muster.").
35. Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 241 A.2d 50, 53 (Me.
1968) (quoting State ex reL Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Wahner, 130 N.W.2d 304,
309 (Wis. 1964)).
36. Id.
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protection,37 observed in the very next sentence that "[t]he lack of
specific standards in the Yarmouth ordinance permits the Board to
go beyond its proper quasi-judicial function.... [T]he Board can
roam at large in policy-making."'  This is separation of powers rea-
soning and was in and of itself a sufficient basis for striking down the
ordinance. The point being made is that Maine courts reviewing lo-
cal land use control ordinances have held consistently that without
"meaningful" standards important constitutional values are violated
or at risk. These constitutional rights and duties can be safeguarded
by requiring that ordinances contain such standards. Only "spe-
cific" standards have the capacity to guide and limit the discretion-
ary power of land use decision-makers. That has been the law in
Maine. The rationale for this view is as valid today as it was twenty-
five years ago when Waterville Hotel was decided. It follows then,
that a "meaningful" standards requirement should remain the law in
Maine.
39
III. SoMEi TROUBLING RE-CENT CASES
As far back as 1986 the first faint signs of departure from the Wa-
terville Hotel, Cope, Wakelin line of cases can be detected in the
reasoning of some of the Law Court justices. In the dissenting opin-
37. See supra text accompanying note 24.
38. Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d at 577.
39. Courts throughout the country recognize the importance of the -meaningful"
standards requirement. See. e.g., Citizens United for Free Speech v. Long Beach
Township Bd., 802 F. Supp. 1223, 1238 n.16 (D. NJ. 1992) (noting that an ordinance
categorizing exempt, prohibited. and permitted signs delegates -a degree of discre-
tion over citizens' rights of expression that may not withstand void-for-vagueness
analysis"); Florida Mining & Materials Corp. v. City of Port Orange. 518 So. 2d 311.
313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (observing that an ordinance requiring that 'traffic
generated and its access and flow to the proposed use shall not adversely impact
adjoining properties and the general public's safety'... can lead to an inequitable
exercise of governmental zoning power due to the vague standards contained
therein" (quoting Port Orange, Fla., Zoning Ordinance)), review denied, 528 So. 2d
1181 (Fla. 1988); Halfway House v. City of Waukegan, 641 N.E.2d 1005, 1009-10 (II.
App. Ct. 1994) (invalidating a condition in an ordinance as "too vague to be enforce-
able" where the condition prohibits halfway houses "from accepting any 'individual
known to be a rapist or adjudged guilty of an offense involving activity of a sexual
nature"' and where the ordinance does not provide any standards to guide the zon-
ing authorities (quoting Waukegan, Ill., Zoning Ordinance 93-0-147, § 2.10(b) (Aug.
2, 1993))); Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. New Lenox, 505 N.E.2d 1, 3 (I11. App.
Ct. 1987) (invalidating zoning ordinance as unconstitutionally vague where list of
permitted and prohibited uses in ordinance is incomplete and where ordinance fails
to provide standards for determining whether proposed use is permitted or prohib-
ited), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 128 (Ill. 1987), and cerL denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988):
Asbury Apartments, JV RPS Management v. Dayton Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No.
15109, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4800, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1995) (per
curiam) (holding void for vagueness a zoning ordinance allowing- '[h]ousing for the
elderly'" as a conditional use (quoting Dayton, Ohio, Zoning Ordinance R.C.G.O.
150.128(E))).
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ion in Bass v. Town of Wilton,4" an opinion that later became criti-
cally important,41 one member of the court was prepared to allow
the Wilton Zoning Board of Appeals to deny a conditional use per-
mit if the proposed use would "devalue adjacent property., 42 This
pivotal standard was not defined specifically by the zoning ordi-
nance, by municipal regulations 4 3 or by the dissenting justice.
Neither the ordinance or regulations, nor the dissenting justice
made clear whether the devaluation must be significant or if a de
minimis loss of value would support a denial.44 In the same vein,
40. 512 A.2d 309 (Me. 1986) (Scolnik, J., dissenting). In Bass a developer applied
to the local Planning Board for a permit to build multi-family dwellings on a parcel
that straddled two zoning districts within the town. Id. at 309. One district allowed
the proposed use, the other district classified it as a conditional use, thus requiring
the applicant to meet specified conditions within the ordinance before receiving
Board approval. Id The Planning Board found that the proposal met the necessary
conditions and approved the project. ld. Adjacent property owners appealed the
decision to the Zoning Board of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Planning
Board. Id. The challengers then appealed to the superior court. l They argued
that the project failed to meet a general requirement in the ordinance that there be
"no structure or construction that will cause blight or devalue adjacent property."
Id. at 310 n.1 (citing Wilton, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 13.16). The superior court
remanded to the Board of Appeals for additional findings regarding the devaluation
of adjacent property. Id. at 310. The Board found that the proposed use would
cause devaluation, and the superior court entered a decision for the neighboring
landowners. Id.
On appeal, the Law Court held that the decision of the Board of Appeals to deny
approval was based upon evidence that the proposed "use" would cause devalua-
tion, and not upon evidence that the "structure or construction" would cause devalu-
ation. Id. at 311. Because the ordinance allowed the Board to deny approval only if
the "structure or construction" caused devaluation, the Board could not deny ap-
proval for a "use" already determined to be appropriate by the local legislative
body. Id. The court affirmed the original decision of the Board of Appeals to grant
the permit. Id. The dissent contended that the "obvious intent" of the Wilton Zon-
ing Ordinance was to authorize the denial of a conditional use permit if the pro-
posed "use" would cause devaluation of adjacent property. Id. (Scolnik, J.,
dissenting). The dissent further observed that the decision to deny the permit was
based upon sufficient evidence of devaluation and should therefore be upheld. Id. at
312.
41. The majority in Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d 898 (Me. 1993),
relied heavily on the Bass dissent in an opinion that sharply calls into question the
vitality of the "meaningful" standards requirement in Maine land use law. Id. at 901.
42. Bass v. Town of Wilton, 512 A.2d at 311 (Scolnik, J., dissenting).
43. Cf. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4403(2) (West Supp. 1995-1996) (giving
municipalities the power to adopt reasonable regulations governing subdivisions).
Definitions provided in subdivision regulations may be applied by analogy to clarify
standards found in zoning ordinances.
44. A number of courts have held, assumed, or noted in dicta that standards for-
bidding the devaluation of property include an additional requirement that the dimi-
nution in value be substantial, serious, or significant. See, e.g., Vasilopoulos v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 340 N.E.2d 19, 21 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (upholding the denial
of a special use application where the proposed project "could cause substantial in-
jury to the value of other property in the neighborhood" (emphasis added)); Board
of County Comm'rs v. Holbrook, 550 A.2d 664,666 (Md. 1988) (affirming the denial
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there was nothing in the ordinance or regulations suggesting the
of an application for a special exception where the proposed use would -'substan-
tially diminish adjacent property values' " (quoting findings of Cecil County Board
of Appeals) (emphasis added)); Video Microwave, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
354 N.Y.S.2d 817, 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (allowing the denial of an application
for a special permit where the proposed use "would seriously reduce the property
value of [neighboring] homes" (emphasis added)); Families Against Reily/Morgan
Sites v. Butler County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 564 N.E.2d 1113,1122 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (upholding the issuance of a conditional use permit where the Zoning Board
of Appeals found that proposed "'use would not unduly adversely affect the prop-
erty values'" (quoting findings of Butler County Zoning Board of Appeals) (em-
phasis added)); Soble Constr. Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 329 A.2d 912, 917 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1974) (holding that the denial of a special use application is invalid
where "[t]he record ... merely indicates that some injury might be cause [sic] to the
value of neighboring properties if the use is permitted, and there is no evidence the
injury will be substantial" (emphasis added)); Pease Hill Community Group v.
County of Spokane, 816 P.2d 37,42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the approval
of a conditional use permit where "[t]he record does not support the contention that
the project, as mitigated, will have significant detrimental effect on [the value of] the
surrounding property" (emphasis added)).
The Law Court has expressed a similar sentiment in a related but not identical
context. See In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A2d 736 (Me. 1973). In Spring Valley the
owner of a 92-acre tract of land began to develop the property into a residential
subdivision without seeking approval under the Site Location of Development Law.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38. §§ 481-490 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995-1996). The State
Environmental Improvement Commission ordered the owner to cease development.
In re Spring Valley Dev.. 300 A.2d at 739, 741. The property owner appealed to the
Law Court, challenging inter alia the constitutionality of the Act on vagueness
grounds. 1d. at 741, 749. The Act mandated approval of a proposed project if the
project "'will not adversely affect existing uses, scenic character, natural resources
or property values in the municipality or in adjoining municipalities.'" ld. at 741 n.3
(quoting title 38, § 484(3)).
The Law Court began its analysis by reading a "reasonableness" requirement into
the provision:
While most such developments may be expected to "affect" the environ-
ment adversely to the extent that they add to the demands already made
upon it, it is the unreasonable effect upon existing uses, scenic character
and natural resources which the Legislature seeks to avoid by empowering
the Commission to measure the nature and extent of the proposed use
against the environment's capacity to tolerate the use.
Id. at 751. The court proceeded to strike down the portion of the standard forbid-
ding an adverse effect on property values. Id. This aspect of the opinion is of partic-
ular importance in light of the Law Court's holding in Gorham. See infra note 66.
The Spring Valley court explained:
For reasons not known to us the Act recites that property values also
must not be (unreasonably) affected. In our opinion, the effect of develop-
ments upon property values is outside the scope and purposes of the Act
and the Commission would be impermissibly applying the force of the
State's police power in the enforcement of this Act if it denied approval of
a development because of failure of proof that property values would not
be adversely affected. We consider the addition of this dubious criterion
constitutionally barred and void.
In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d at 751. The court concluded that the property
value provision was severable and did not affect the validity of the remainder of the
Act. Id.
1996]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
type of evidence or evidentiary standard that would be sufficient to
discharge the burden of showing that there will be no future devalu-
ation of adjacent property. The dissenting justice would allow the
Board to hear competing expert appraisers and anecdotal testimony
as to value.4 5 The Board could decide whom it believes, and then
presumably, if the devaluation is as little as one dollar, the Board
could deny the special exception. 416 The totality of this standard and
evidentiary testimony, according to the dissenting justice, would not
be "unfettered discretion '47 and would "not constitute an improper
delegation of legislative authority to the Board of Appeals., 48
Fortunately, the Bass majority did not support the weakening of
the "meaningful" standards concept that the dissent's line of reason-
ing portends. The majority interpreted the ordinance as not author-
izing the Zoning Board of Appeals to deny a permitted conditional
"use" on generalized devaluation grounds.49 Only devaluation aris-
ing from a particular or unique characteristic of the "structure or
construction" could be the basis for a denial.5" Because the oppo-
Although the Spring Valley decision concerns the Site Location of Development
Law, the purposes of the state enactment are similar, if not identical, to the purposes
of local zoning ordinances. Section 481 of the Site Location of Development Law
states that the purpose of the Act is "to insure that such developments will be lo-
cated in a manner which will have a minimal adverse impact on the natural environ-
ment within the development sites and of their surroundings and protect the health,
safety and general welfare of the people." Title 38, § 481. Similarly, the primary
purpose of municipal zoning ordinances is "to serve or promote the health, safety,
morals, or welfare of the community." 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING 3D § 7.04, at 695 (1986). See also Toulouse v. Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment, 147 Me. 387, 393, 87 A.2d 670, 673 (1952) ("The justification for the restric-
tions imposed by zoning statutes and ordinances is given as 'in the interest of health,
safety, or the general welfare.' " (citing R.S. ch. 80, §§ 84-87 (1944))).
In upholding the Act the court observed that "[t]he standards here [other than the
property devaluation standard] are much more explicit than those which we found
to be insufficient in Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals. .. ." In re
Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d at 751. By comparing the standards in the Site Loca-
tion of Development Law with those in the Waterville Hotel zoning ordinance, the
Law Court's reasoning demonstrates that there is no difference between an analysis
of the adequacy of standards within a state land use statute and an analysis of the
adequacy of standards within a local zoning ordinance. It follows then, that if a state
administrative body cannot consider the adverse effect on property values because
that standard is unconstitutionally vague, then a local administrative body cannot
use a similar standard. These issues unfortunately were not raised or discussed in
Gorham.
45. Bass v. Town of Wilton, 512 A.2d at 312 (Scolnik, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id
48. Id.
49. Id. at 311.
50. Id This is the same line of reasoning originally developed by the Law Court
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 260 A.2d 434 (Me. 1970). In
Phillips Petroleum the court observed that there must be "unique or distinctive char-
acteristics" about a proposed structure before a Board of Zoning Appeals can deny
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nents of the project did not present any evidence on this point, the
denial was improper.51
conditional use approval. Id. at 435. The ordinance in Phillips Petroleum provided
that gasoline service stations were allowed "'only upon approval of the Zoning
Board of Appeals.'" Id. at 434 (quoting Bangor, Me.. Zoning Ordinance). The
court noted that the ordinance lacked specific standards governing the approval pro-
cess. Id. at 436. Although the court did not ultimately decide the case based upon
the adequacy or inadequacy of standards, it did observe that
the ordinance by permitting the construction and operation of a gasoline
service station as a conditional use within the zone constitutes a legislative
determination that such stations are not ordinarily detrimental or injurious to
the neighborhood within the zone. What appear to be lacking are guide-
lines by which a board can determine what unique or distinctive characteris-
tics of a particular station will render it detrimental or injurious to the
neighborhood when other stations in the zone are not.
Id. at 435 (emphasis added). In short, the Board cannot prohibit a project based
upon adverse effects thought to be caused by a permitted conditional use because
the legislative body has already determined that the use is generally appropriate in
the zoning district. The Board can only deny a permitted conditional use if the spe-
cific structure has unique or distinctive characteristics described and forbidden in the
ordinance.
The majority in Bass adopted this rationale fully. Its conclusions were strength-
ened by the fact that the Vilton Ordinance specifically forbade "structurefs] or con-
struction that will cause blight or devalue adjacent property." Bass v. Town of
Wilton, 512 A.2d at 310 n.1 (citing Wilton. Me., Zoning Ordinance § 13.16) (empha-
sis added). The court held that the ordinance did not and could not authorize the
Zoning Board of Appeals to deny a permit for a -use" generally permitted in the
zone. Id at 311. That would allow the Board to exclude a use that the local legisla-
tive body previously determined to be appropriate. Id.
In the context of special exceptions or conditional uses, where the legisla-
tive body has determined that a particular use is ordinarily acceptable in a
particular zone, the legislative body cannot absolutely empower an admin-
istrative board to reject an individual application for that use. The legisla-
tive body must instead specify conditions that would permit a rejection.
ld. at 310 (citing Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 241 A.2d 50,
52 (Me. 1968)). As Phillips Petroleum suggests, the most the Board in Bass could be
authorized to do is deny an otherwise approvable conditional use because of a
unique characteristic of the "structure or construction." No evidence to this effect
was presented. Thus the Board's decision in Bass was inappropriate. Although both
Phillips Petroleum and Bass recognized and approved the distinction between legis-
latively permitted uses, which a board cannot reexamine, and violations of standards
arising from unique characteristics of particular structures, which may lead to a
board denial, the majority in Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d 898 (Me.
1993), completely ignored this distinction. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying
text. In doing so it disregarded important separation of powers principles.
51. Bass v. Town of Vilton, 512 A.2d at 311. The court explained:
Our review of the Board's findings reveals that any devaluation of adjacent
property found by the Board was based upon the proposed use and not
upon the structure or construction proposed. Indeed the evidence offered
by the plaintiffs on the issue of devaluation focused upon... factors relat-
ing to the use of the property for multi-family dwellings. The nature of the
structures themselves played no part in the determination of devaluation.
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A second troubling case arose in 1988, McCallum v. City of Bid-
deford.52 The issue in McCallum was the adequacy of a zoning ordi-
nance standard that required appeals from decisions of the building
inspector to be taken within thirty days, "except that the board,
upon a showing of good cause, may waive the 30 day require-
ment."53 The ordinance did not define or give examples of what
would constitute "good cause." No regulations defined the term in
words or by example. The court in its holding did not define the
term or aver to any body of law that delineated or limited the
phrase.' 4 In conclusory fashion the court noted, "We hold that
52. 551 A.2d 452 (Me. 1988).
53. Id. at 453 (quoting Biddeford, Me., Zoning Ordinance art. XVI. § 6(A)(1))
(emphasis added). The landowners in McCallum applied for a building permit,
which the building inspector issued on October 2, 1986. Id. On October 27 the
inspector ordered construction to cease. Id. He withdrew that order on February
20, 1987. Id On February 25 an abutting neighbor filed an appeal, opposing the
October 2 issuance of the building permit. Id Despite the fact that the ordinance
required appeals to be taken within 30 days of the decision appealed from, the
Board allowed the abutting landowner to appeal the issuance of the permit. Id. The
Board explained that because of the intervening order to cease construction, the
abutter had "good cause" for not meeting the 30-day deadline, which commenced to
run on October 2. Id. The permit applicants appealed the decision. Id. They ar-
gued that the "good cause" provision of the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague
and that because the abutters had not appealed the issuance of the permit within 30
days following October 2, their appeal should be denied. Id The Law Court upheld
the constitutionality of the "good cause" standard and affirmed the Board's decision
to allow the appeal of the permit issuance. Id.
54. See, e.g., Maine Real Estate Comm'n v. Kelby, 360 A.2d 528 (Me. 1976). In
Kelby a real estate broker challenged the constitutionality of standards in a statute
regulating the conduct of brokers. The statutory provision in question allowed for
the suspension or revocation of a broker's license where the broker demonstrated
"bad faith, incompetency or untrustworthiness, or dishonest, fraudulent or improper
dealings." Id. at 529-30 n.3 (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 4056(1)(N)
[prior to amendments effective October 1, 1975]). The broker argued that the provi-
sion was unconstitutionally vague. Id at 531. The court upheld the statute,
explaining:
Subsection N proscribes "bad faith, incompetency or untrustworthiness, or
dishonest, fraudulent or improper dealings," not in the abstract, but on the
part of real estate brokers and salesmen. Subsection N is, in effect, a codifi-
cation of the normative standards which guide the conduct of the members
of the real estate profession. Subsection N is sufficiently definite to apprise
those in the profession of the line between permissible and forbidden
conduct.
Id at 532. Although the McCallum court cited Kelby as support for its finding of
constitutionality, see infra note 55 and accompanying text, McCallum differs from
Kelby in that the Kelby standards are sustained only because they are defined and
limited by normative standards within the real estate profession. In McCallum,
however, there is no existing body of law or customary conduct that defines "good
cause" as that term is used in the Biddeford Zoning Ordinance.
Similarly, the arguably vague terms in variance provisions of zoning statutes and
ordinances are upheld because similar if not identical provisions are utilized by mu-
nicipalities throughout the country. This has allowed a body of case law to develop
that defines and gives meaning to the critical terms, thus precluding discriminatory
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'good cause' is a reasonable and intelligible standard that does not
force people of general intelligence to guess at its meaning and
therefore it is not 'void for vagueness.' "I Beyond this case, how-
ever, in which the city's own actions caused the delay in filing the
appeal, "guess" is precisely what one must do to determine what
other circumstances will allow the thirty-day appeal period to be
waived. Does "manifest unfairness," "hardship," or "honest mis-
take" constitute "good cause?" Do principles of "tolling" apply?'
Must some type of "estoppel" factor be present?s7 The Waterville
Hotel line of cases would suggest that a standard so uncertain is no
standard at all.
The 1991 case Lentine v. Town of St. George5" raises some of the
same questions. Plaintiffs, the owners of shorefront property,
sought to build a dock (a common undertaking in Downeast Maine)
extending into Teel Cove in Port Clyde Harbor. The Planning
Board denied approval of the project, and the Zoning Board of Ap-
peals affirmed. The denial was predicated on the Lentines' failure
to show, as required by the ordinance, that the dock would "be no
larger in dimension than necessary to carry on the activity and be
consistent with existing conditions, use, and character of the area. 5 9
These two critical terms were not defined by the ordinance, by regu-
action by local land use boards. See Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Yarmouth.
313 A.2d 741,748 (Me. 1974) (holding that the "broadly stated crntenon" of -undue
hardship" in a variance provision of a local ordinance "is sufficient to guide the
Board in granting or denying variances"). Standards in conditional use provisions
vary from municipality to municipality and encompass a wide variety of topics. Be-
cause of this variety it is difficult for a body of case law to develop that will suffi-
ciently constrain municipal boards in applying conditional use standards.
55. McCallum v. City of Biddeford. 551 A.2d at 453 (citing Maine Real Estate
Comm'n v. Kelby, 360 A.2d 528. 531 (Me. 1976)).
56. The court in McCallum almost certainly reached a proper result, but its al-
lowance of a right of appeal, predicated as it was on the adequacy of the standard, is
troublesome. Alternative rationale were readily available. For example, under the
doctrine of equitable tolling "the statute of limitations is tolled when strict applica-
tion of the statute of limitations would be inequitable." Dasha v. Maine Medical
Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 996 n.2 (Me. 1995). The McCallum court could have held that
the order to cease construction tolled the 30-day requirement and that the with-
drawal of the order recommenced its running. This would have allowed the abutting
landowner additional days to appeal the issuance of the permit.
57. The court in McCallum could have upheld the decision of the Zoning Board
of Appeals to waive the 30-day requirement based upon the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. Under this theory the Town would be estopped from denying the appeal
of the abutting landowner because the Town's agent, by issuing an order to cease
work, was the cause of the confusion regarding the 30-day deadline. The court
should have invalidated the "good cause" standard as unconstitutionally vague, or it
should have declined to reach the question. The application of equitable estoppel
would not have helped the permit applicants, but it would have prevented the Board
and the court from relying upon a vague standard to achieve a justified end result.
58. 599 A.2d 76 (Me. 1991).
59. Id. at 78 n.2 (quoting St. George, Me., Shoreland Zoning Ordinance
§ 13(F)(4)) (emphasis added).
1996]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
lation, or by the court. The court, however, sustained the ordinance,
dismissing as unfounded plaintiffs' assertions that the standards
were unconstitutionally vague.60
Yet the standards are vague. For example, does the "dimension"
standard mean "minimally necessary" or "ideally necessary?" Is the
allowable dimension a function of the boat owned by the applicant
at the moment, the average sized boat in use in the area, or a
smaller boat for which the applicant could settle? Does the "consis-
tent with" standard mean the same color, materials, or type of con-
struction? Does it refer to the purposes for which the boats and
dock spaces in the cove are used (fishing activities as opposed to
pleasure boating)? Or, as the court suggested, is the "consistent
with" criterion "merely a second criterion for judging the allowable
size of a proposed wharf."' 61 Do the first dock builders in a cove
establish the pattern with which all who follow must be consistent?
To ask these questions is to see how impossibly vague these stan-
dards are and how much "unfettered discretion" is left in the hands
of the Zoning Board.
One wonders why the reasoning and the holding in Wakelin are
not controlling. By substituting the Lentine standards and hypothet-
ical factors into a previously cited Wakelin passage,6 one sees in
Lentine the same defects found unconstitutional in Wakelin:
Absent specific standards giving content to the term ["no
larger in dimension than necessary"], whether that term means
60. AL at 78.
61. Id. at 79 (emphasis added). Even if this questionable reasoning of the court is
accepted, the constitutional problem does not go away. In an effort to clarify its
reasoning, the court noted:
[A]s applied here, section 13(F)(4) provides that the Lentines' wharf may
not be either (1) "larger in dimension than necessary to carry on the activ-
ity" of deep water access for the Lentines' pleasure boat, or (2) "larger in
dimension than ... [will] be consistent with existing conditions, use, and
character of the area." ... [T]he second dimensional requirement.. . is that
the proposed wharf may not be so large that it conflicts or interferes with
existing conditions, use, and character of the area that would be affected by
the wharf.
Id. Did the court literally mean what it said? Is the allowable dimension of a wharf
a function of the size of the boat the Lentines happen to own? One would hope not.
The court construed "consistent with" to mean "not conflicting or interfering with,"
id., but even if viewed only in a dimensional sense the latter phrase is as imprecise as
the one it replaced. Is wharf size and non-interference to be measured at low-tide,
high-tide, or half-tide? Can the Lentines or any other applicant build whatever size
wharf they want as long as it does not interfere with a wharf already in use? Again,
one would hope not. What size wharf does the "character of the area" allow? These
questions and the questions posed in the text of this Article suggest that the ordi-
nance as written and the court's reformulation of the 13(F)(4) standards are both
unconstitutionally vague. Under either approach the Zoning Board of Appeals may
approve or deny what it will. Applicants like the Lentines have no idea what size
wharf is permitted or what they must show to gain Board approval.
62. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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[50 feet or 500 feet] or something else entirely, is a matter of
conjecture. Similarly, absent specific standards giving content
to the term ["consistent with existing conditions"], whether
that term signifies [color, type of construction, purposes for
which the dock is built, size] or something else entirely, is also
a matter of conjecture. Such uncertainty is
impermissible.63
The uncertainties in Lentine are as impermissible as the uncertain-
ties in Wakelin. The Wakelin court, commenting on the unconstitu-
tional standards in the ordinance before it, noted, "The ordinance
fails to articulate the quantitative standards necessary to transform
the unmeasured qualities 'intensity of use' and 'density of develop-
ment' into specific criteria objectively usable by both the Board and
the applicant in gauging the compatibility of a proposed use with
existing uses in the surrounding area."' This reasoning and the
finding of unconstitutionality should apply with equal force in Len-
tine. The Lentine standards are as unmeasured and vague as those
found wanting and struck down in Wakelin.
The most troubling recent case, Gorham v. Town of Cape Eliza-
beth,65 came down in 1993. 6 This decision is the most troubling be-
cause a majority of the court now accepts the mischievous dissenting
rationale of Bass.67 The rationale of the Bass majority was not over-
ruled, it was simply ignored without comment. Troubling too is the
fact that the Gorham court, unlike the courts in McCallum and Len-
tine, had its attention focused on the Waterville Hotel, Cope. Wakelin
line of cases.' It purported to follow this body of case law. In real-
ity, the court ignored the substance of these prior holdings, leaving
them weakened at best, implicitly overruled at worst.
63. Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575, 577 (Me. 1987).
64. Id.
65. 625 A.2d 898 (Me. 1993).
66. In Gorham the owner of a single family residence filed an application for a
conditional use permit to add an apartment within his home. I at 899. Despite the
fact that there would be no changes to the exterior of the residence or to the parking
area, the Cape Elizabeth Zoning Board of Appeals denied the permit. Id. The
Board found that the addition would "'adversely affect the value of adjacent
properties.'" ILd. (quoting Cape Elizabeth, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 19-4-7(b)(4)).
The landowner appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the Ordinance failed to provide
sufficient standards and therefore impermissibly delegated legislative authority to
the Board. I&. at 899-900. The superior court entered a judgment for the Town and
the landowner appealed to the Law Court. Id. at 900. Quoting the Bass dissent as
supporting rationale, the Law Court held that the devaluation standard was -suffi-
ciently specific to be constitutional." AL at 901.
67. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
68. Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d at 900-02 (citing Wakelin v.
Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575 (Me. 1987); Bass v. Town of Wilton, 512 A.d 309
(Me. 1986); Cope v. Town of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223 (Me. 1983); Stucki v. Plavin,
291 A.2d 508 (Me. 1972)).
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Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Gorham, however, is that it
is already being followed by lower courts in Maine in land use set-
tings where planning boards purposefully have used vague standards
to keep out unwanted development activities. For example, in the
recent case of Pharos House v. City of Portland,6 9 the superior court
held that two of the City's zoning ordinance standards in a three-
pronged test 70 were either inapplicable or unconstitutional. 71 The
court went on to note, "However, the third prong is sufficiently spe-
cific under the Law Court's most recent case on this issue, Gorham
v. Town of Cape Elizabeth .... The third prong of the Portland
ordinance offers at least as much guidance as the provision inter-
preted in Gorham.'' 72 The fact that this case is under appeal and
may or may not be affirmed misses the point. The point is that the
Bass dissent, and the majority opinions in McCallum, Lentine, and
now Gorham have sent an unfortunate signal-broad standards
conferring almost "unfettered discretion" will be sustained. As Pha-
ros House indicates, planning boards and lower courts will be quick
to follow the Law Court's direction to the detriment of the "mean-
ingful" standards doctrine and the constitutional values that the doc-
trine seeks to protect. The historical requirement of "meaningful"
standards, standards that guide and restrain unelected land use deci-
sion-makers, seems to have been abandoned or at least significantly
relaxed.
Returning to the analytical weaknesses of the Gorham opinion, it
is clear that all of the reservations expressed above with respect to
the Bass dissent apply in Gorham. The critical phrase "will not ad-
versely affect the value of adjacent properties '73 was not defined by
the ordinance, by regulation, or by the reviewing court. Here, too,
there was no indication as to whether a significant or unreasonable
69. CV-93-1228 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Oct. 17, 1994) (Brennan, J.). In Pha-
ros House the applicant, a Maine corporation that provides housing and transition
services to pre-release prisoners and parolees, applied for conditional use and site
plan approval to build a pre-release facility in the City of Portland. Id. at 1. The
Planning Board denied the approvals, and Pharos House appealed. Id. The supe-
rior court affirmed. Id.
70. The three-pronged test of the Portland Zoning Ordinance states:
Upon a showing that a proposed use is a conditional use under this article,
a conditional use permit shall be granted unless the board determines that:
a. There are unique or distinctive characteristics or effects associated with
the proposed conditional use;
b. There will be an adverse impact upon the health, safety, or welfare of
the public or the surrounding area; and
c. Such impact differs substantially from the impact which would normally
occur from such a use in that zone.
Id at 2 n.2 (quoting Portland, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 14-474).
71. Id at 2-3.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d 898, 901 n.3 (Me. 1993) (quot-
ing Cape Elizabeth, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 19-4-7(b)(4)).
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"adverse affect" must be avoided or if a de minimis loss of value
would sustain a denial.74 In addition, the "will not adversely affect"
standard embraced in Gorham requires the applicant to prove a
negative. This negative involves future events the proof or disproof
of which can only be both subjective and speculative. Moreover, the
future value of adjacent properties is determined by the combined
effect of a wide variety of economic, neighborhood, community, and
market factors. The developer's proposed activity is only a rela-
tively minor factor. Its independent effect on the value of adjacent
properties is impossible to distinguish or predict. Given these facts,
imposing a standard that requires the developer to demonstrate that
the proposed use will not have an adverse effect on the value of
adjacent properties seems to create an almost impossible burden, an
unconstitutionally vague burden.7"
Finally, as the dissent in Gorham pointed out, the majority's rea-
soning, which accepted generalized evidence that multi-family units
in a neighborhood adversely affect the value of single family homes,
allowed the Zoning Board of Appeals to reexamine, reconsider, and
reject the legislative judgment that such housing is a permitted con-
ditional use in the zone.76 This approach flies in the face of the ma-
jority's reasoning in Bass; it ignores Phillips Petroleum; and it seems
to overrule Cope. The latter case, directly on point, noted:
Whether the use will generally comply with the health, safety
and welfare of the public and the essential character of the
74. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
75. The burden is further heightened because the standard leaves additional criti-
cal questions unresolved. What is the time frame for measuring whether there will
be an adverse effect? Must the applicant show that there will be no adverse effect by
the completion date of the proposed project, one year later, or five years later?
Which parcels qualify as the "adjacent properties" that must not be adversely af-
fected? Do they include properties that abut the developer's property. are within
one block, or are less than one mile away? The failure of the ordinance and the
court to suggest any parameters to these dimensions of the standard gives the Board
of Zoning Appeals latitude to apply any criteria it chooses.
76. The dissent observed:
The evidence [offered by the opponents of the project] ... did not explain
what there was about Gorham's particular proposal that made it harmful to
the value of adjacent properties. Rather, all the opponents' comments
were addressed to the more general idea that multi-family units adversely
affect the value of single family homes.
Because the Town of Cape Elizabeth had already made a legislative de-
termination that multi-family units would not ordinarily affect the value of
surrounding properties, it was beyond the powers of the Board to accept
evidence contrary to that determination. In fact, the Board's adoption of
the theory that multi-family units devalue surrounding property effectively
precludes approval of any plan proposing a multi-family unit, clearly con-
travening legislative intent.
Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d at 904 (Roberts, J., with whom Rud-
man, J., joins, dissenting). This is precisely the reasoning of the Bass and Phillips
Petroleum courts. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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area is a legislative question. The delegation is improper if the
Board is permitted to decide that same legislative question
anew, without specific guidelines which permit the Board to
determine what unique or distinctive characteristics of a par-
ticular apartment building will render it detrimental or injuri-
ous to the neighborhood. I
In Gorham there were no "specific guidelines" and there was no
"unique or distinctive" evidence showing an adverse effect on the
value of adjacent properties.7" The Planning Board considered
"anew" and rejected the legislative judgment of the Selectmen of
Cape Elizabeth. Case law from Waterville Hotel to Wakelin says that
this cannot happen, that such actions are unconstitutional. Yet
Gorham inexplicably sanctions such conduct.
The last and most recent case in this troubling line is Town of
Pownal v. Emerson.79 In Emerson the district court fined the de-
fendant for maintaining an unlicensed "automobile graveyard" and
"junkyard" as defined by Maine statutes.80 The court also ordered
the defendant to clean up the property or face additional fines and
enforcement fees. 81 In his defense, Emerson first asserted that the
boards, barrels, car parts, pipes, wheelbarrows, etc., were all useful
items to him, and that he had every right to own and store these
items on his property against the day when he would use or dispose
of them as he saw fit.82
Second and more important, Emerson argued that the statutory
definitions of "automobile graveyard" and "junkyard" are inher-
ently vague and thus unconstitutional.83 He further asserted that
the statutory terms "unserviceable," "discarded," "worn-out," and
77. Cope v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223, 227 (Me. 1983) (footnote
omitted).
78. See supra note 76.
79. 639 A.2d 619 (Me. 1994).
80. IL at 620. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 3753 (West Pamph. 1995-
1996) ("No person may establish, operate or maintain an automobile graveyard, au-
tomobile recycling business or junkyard without first obtaining a nontransferable
permit .... "). The statute defines "automobile graveyard" as "a yard, field or other
area used to store 3 or more unserviceable, discarded, worn-out or junked motor
vehicles . I..." d. § 3752(1). The statute defines "junkyard" as:
4. [A] yard, field or other area used to store:
A. Discarded, worn-out or junked plumbing, heating supplies, house-
hold appliances and turniture;
B. Discarded, scrap and junked lumber;
C. Old or scrap copper, brass, rope, rags, batteries, paper trash, rub-
ber debris, waste and all scrap iron, steel and other scrap ferrous or
nonferrous material; and
D. Garbage dumps, waste dumps and sanitary fills.
Id. § 3752(4)(A-D).
81. Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A.2d at 620.
82. Brief for Appellant at 21, Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A.2d 619 (Me.
1994) (No. CUM-93-511).
83. 1&. at 22.
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"junked" are similarly defective.' 4 None of these terms were de-
fined by the statute or by any implementing state regulations. Nor
had the Town in any local ordinance or regulation defined these
terms or precisely delineated what is prohibited and what is permit-
ted regarding non-commercial storage of used materials on private
property. The majority opinion also failed to give adequate mean-
ing to these termss or to the dividing line between permissible and
impermissible, legal and illegal conduct.
Instead, the majority, after viewing photographs of the Emerson
property and no doubt subscribing to the maxims "I know it when I
see it" and "one picture is worth a thousand words,"' " simply pro-
nounced the statute "not unconstitutionally vague"8s and affirmed
the decision of the lower court. That is not judicial reasoning. It is
judicial fiat, a fiat that ignores without comment the reasoning of
the Waterville Hotel, Cope, Wakelin line of cases, which Emerson's
counsel and the dissenting justices sought to press upon the major-
84. ld. at 24. Emerson argued that the defects in the statute could have been
avoided if the legislature had defined the terms using "objective criteria such as a
vehicle's age, registration status. or inspection status ... ." Il In fact. at least one
state has attempted to avoid the vagueness problem by defining a -junk motor vehi-
cle" as "a discarded, dismantled, wrecked, scrapped or ruined motor vehicle or parts
thereof,.., which is allowed to remain unregistered for a period of ninety days from
the date of discovery." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2241(6) (1992) (emphasis added).
85. The majority did not address the terms -discarded." "worn-out." and
"junked." It discussed only the term "unserviceable." Town of Pownal v. Emerson,
639 A.2d at 621. It observed that despite the lack of a definition in the statute, "a
dictionary in common use defines 'serviceable' as 'that can be of service, ready for
use, useful, useable .... '" Id. (quoting WEBSmR's NEW\ WoR.D DtcrzoNARY 1301
(2d College ed. 1978)) (emphasis omitted). The majority concluded that "an unser-
viceable vehicle is one not ready for use or not presently useable." Id. But surely
not all such vehicles are "junk," capable of triggering enforcement of the junkyard
and automobile graveyard statute against a private landowner whose motor vehicles
are not immediately ready for use. The court's definition is simply too broad.
86. The dissenting justices recognized the weaknesses of such an approach. They
accurately stated that the standards in the junkyard and automobile graveyard stat-
ute are inherently subjective. "[Tihe municipal officers in this case [are not] pro-
vided with any guide other than their aesthetic reaction to the appearance of
another's yard." Id. at 622 (Dana, J., with whom Glassman, I., joins, dissenting).
The dissent further observed:
Emerson's predicament calls to mind the sage observation of his putative
ancestor that "one man's beauty is another's ugliness." What was junk to
the selectmen is valuable personal property to Emerson. The statute pro-
vides no help in discerning which is which. In the instant case, it created a
roving band of aestheticians who found violations based not on any set of
objective criteria but rather on arbitrary, personal predilections.
Id. (citing RALPH NVALDO EMERSON, CIRCI.e. IN ESSAYS: FIRST SERIEs 247, 259
(1841)). The majority's approach opens the door to arbitrary enforcement and
leaves landowners guessing as to the meaning of the statute. Id.
87. Id. at 621.
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ity.88 The dissent in Emerson was correct in observing that the criti-
cal terms of the statute are not self-defining; that there is something
of a circular character to the dictionary definitions of these terms;89
and that there is a highly subjective element to these terms as they
are used within the statute.
More important, the dissent was correct when it asserted that
these uncertainties as to statutory meaning, this vagueness, this sub-
jectivity, have been found unconstitutional in a long line of Maine
cases.9" The dissent would strike down the statute in question and
Emerson's liability under it.91 In support of their view, the dissent-
ing justices offered numerous case law citations that are very much
on point and that bear out their analysis and reasoning. Ignoring
this case law does nothing to enhance the majority's reasoning. The
majority in Emerson did not clarify the law with respect to "mean-
ingful" standards, but only added to what this Article has character-
ized as "some troubling recent cases."'
88. See Appellant's Brief at 22-26, Town of Pownal v. Emerson (No. CUM-93-
511) (discussing the equal protection and due process implications of vague stan-
dards); Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A.2d at 622 (Dana, J., with whom Glass-
man, J., joins, dissenting) (citing Cope, Waterville Hotel, Chandler, Stucki, and
Wakelin).
89. The dissent explained:
According to Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (2d ed. 1974), to
abandon means "to forsake entirely"; to discard means "to get rid of as no
longer valuable or useful"; and to junk means "to throw away as worth-
less." Each word is a synonym of the other two. For something to be
worn-out, it must be "used until no longer effective, usable, or serviceable."
For something to be unserviceable, it must no longer "give good service,"
or be "beneficial, profitable or helpful."
Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A.2d at 622 (Dana, J., with whom Glassman, J.,
joins, dissenting). The dissent recognized that standards that define themselves by
circular definition are inadequate and unconstitutional.
90. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
91. Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A.2d at 622 (Dana, J., with whom Glassman,
J., joins, dissenting).
92. The troubling aspect of Emerson is not that the majority reached an incorrect
result, but that it did so in an injurious manner. The purpose of the junkyard and
automobile graveyard statute is to eliminate nuisances that interfere with the health,
safety, and general welfare of the public. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 3751
(West Supp. 1995-1996). Arguably, the material stored on Emerson's property did
constitute a nuisance. Thus in upholding Emerson's liability the Law Court proba-
bly acted in a manner consistent with legislative intent. But laudable ends cannot be
achieved through impermissible means. By validating the statutory standards the
court encourages legislative bodies to adopt ambiguous laws and regulatory stan-
dards. The court sends a message that vague enactments are sufficient and thereby
jeopardizes the constitutional values protected by the "meaningful" standards
requirement.
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IV. RECONCILING Two CONFLIcrING LINES OF CASE LAW
Some may be tempted to say that there is nothing to reconcile,
that the dissenting opinion in Bass and the majority views in McCal-
lum, Lentine, Gorham, and Emerson constitute a new line of cases
setting out the Law Court's present thinking with respect to land use
standards. It follows that the court has implicitly overruled, or at
least significantly modified, the Waterville Hotel, Cope, Wakelin line
of cases. This reasoning fails to take into account several important
factors. To begin, a dissenting opinion and four other court opin-
ions, two that contain strong dissents,93 and two that do not mean-
ingfully address the Waterville Hotel, Cope, Wakelin reasoning,9 do
not yet rise to the level of a "line of cases" sufficient to dispose of
over twenty-five years of unanimously decided land use case law.95
More important, however, is the fact that in Gorham, perhaps the
most significant case in this asserted "new" line of cases, the major-
ity purported to be following, not repudiating, the reasoning of Wa-
93. See Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A.2d 619 (Me. 1994) (Dana. J., with
whom Glassman, J., joins, dissenting); Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth. 625 A.2d
898 (Me. 1993) (Roberts, J., with whom Rudman. J.. joins, dissenting).
94. See Lentine v. Town of St. George, 599 A2d 76 (Me. 1991); McCallum v. City
of Biddeford, 551 A2d 452 (Me. 1988).
95. The Law Court also has recognized the importance of "meaningful" stan-
dards in non-land use settings. See, e.g.. City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A2d 646.
648 (Me. 1985) (rejecting a challenge that an obscenity ordinance is so vague that it
violates due process where the ordinance is patterned after a definition of obscenity
upheld by the United States Supreme Court); State v. Boyajian, 344 A.2d 410,412-
13 (Me. 1975) (upholding a statute that gives the Board of Commissioners of the
Profession of Pharmacy the right to designate certain drugs as -potent medicinal
substances" where the statute "contains limitations, readily understandable by ex-
perienced pharmacists, on the type of materials to be designated as 'potent medici-
nal substances"' (quoting ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2210)); Swed v.
Inhabitants of Bar Harbor, 158 Me. 220,225.227. 182 A2d 664,667-69 (1962) (hold-
ing "vague, violative of due process of law and therefore unconstitutional" provi-
sions in a statute and ordinance authorizing municipal officers to regulate the
licensing of "bric-a-brac, linen stores" where the term "bric-a-brac" is undefined,
"incalculably anomalous and ... not satisfactorily amenable to classification or ex-
planation"); Kovack v. Licensing Bd. of Waterville, 157 Me. 411,420, 173 A.2d 554,
558 (1961) (holding that a statute authorizing the revocation of a victualer's license
provides sufficient standards where the statute includes procedural safeguards that
prevent the licensing board from acting arbitrarily); Opinion of the Justices, 155 Me.
30,48-49, 152 A.2d 81, 90 (1959) (declaring that a proposed statute would be uncon-
stitutional as an improper delegation of legislative power where the statute gives
various powers to the Commissioner of Inland Fisheries and Game without making
reference to existing fish or game laws or administrative standards, and without set-
ting forth the duties imposed on the Commissioner or the ministerial acts authorized
for the performance of those duties); Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg.
Co., 153 Me. 265, 272, 136 A.2d 542, 547 (1957) (observing that if the court were to
hold that the Unfair Sales Act applies to producers and manufacturers, the statute
would be "too vague, uncertain and conjectural when so applied to satisfy the consti-
tutional requirements of due process of law").
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terville Hotel, Cope, and Wakelin.96 This could be viewed as a good
thing. Waterville Hotel, Cope, and Wakelin are seemingly alive and
well. Delegations of decision-making authority must still contain
"meaningful" standards. A more insightful analysis, however,
would recognize the mischief in this view of Gorham and the related
cases. The reasoning in Gorham keeps Waterville Hotel, Cope, and
Wakelin alive in form, but it eviscerates the substance of these cases.
It does so quietly; no cases in the Waterville Hotel line are overruled
but their critical dimension, that standards be "specific" and "mean-
ingful," is no longer the unequivocal rule of law in Maine. The
vague, watered-down standards of McCallum, Lentine, Gorham, and
Emerson are now adequate. Twenty-five years of existing case law
to the contrary does not even get the dignity of a decent burial. The
rationale and utility of this body of law and of the "meaningful"
standards requirement was never fully addressed, not in Gorham or
in any other of the troubling cases noted. This is an important and
unfortunate change in Maine law.
There are two explanations for this apparent turn of events. The
first is more ominous from the perspective of the Authors. It is that
the court fully intends this change in the law with respect to delega-
tions of land use control power and standards, and is content not to
overrule explicitly a long and contrary line of Maine cases. Instead
the court either ignores or distinguishes these cases and, notwith-
standing its earlier pronouncements with respect to separation of
powers, due process, and equal protection, regards a more relaxed
delegation doctrine and standards requirement as appropriate. 97 If
this actually is the Law Court's view, it is unlikely that any of the
arguments advanced in this Article in support of a "meaningful"
standards requirement will change the court's mind. Nothing short
of a series of cases in which abuse of discretion, with all of its attend-
ant evils, is shockingly in evidence is likely to move the court back
to the Waterville Hotel, Cope, Wakelin line of cases.
There is, however, a second, more benign, and more likely expla-
nation for the McCallum, Lentine, Gorham, and Emerson holdings.
It is, quite simply, that the court in these cases did not intend to, and
did not in fact, overrule the Waterville Hotel line of cases. The court
did not have its attention focused on, and thus saw no inconsistency
with, prior case law. It did not have brought home to it the fact that
the individual, seemingly simple, cases before it raised important
and far-reaching delegation and standards questions that would
96. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
97. Cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATuTORY INTERPRETATION 10-
11 (1994) (criticizing as unrealistic originalist theories of statutory interpretation that
rely on the notion that administrators and judges simply follow given directives, and
discussing the inevitability of dynamic statutory interpretation, which allows statutes
to "take[ ] on new meaning in light of subsequent formal, social, and ideological
developments").
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have to be answered. If this is the more accurate explanation of the
troubling recent cases, the court must be encouraged to find a vehi-
cle that will enable it to reiterate the rationale behind the "meaning-
ful" standards requirement, and apply that requirement in such a
way as to reaffirm the court's historic position on these issues.
The suggested resolution of the very real conflict that these recent
cases have created requires the judiciary to do nothing more than
fulfill its constitutional duty to "'interpret and administer the
laws.' ,,8 Moreover, this approach is not only in accord with long-
standing state delegation and standards case law in Maine, but ac-
cords with the views of other jurisdictions that have considered
these very issues. 9 An Arizona court, for example, has noted
pointedly:
The Court recognizes that some writers have advocated the
discontinuance of the "adequate standards" rule for testing
claimed unconstitutional delegations of legislative power ....
We find no Arizona decisions adopting this view, and we are
not persuaded that it is in reality consonant with the funda-
mental separation of powers considerations which underlie the
prohibition against delegations of power constitutionally
vested in the legislature.'
This is precisely the view the Authors urge Maine's highest court to
take.
V. CONCLUSION
The late Justice Thurgood Marshall, speaking for a unanimous
United States Supreme Court on the issue of standards, stated:
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is
void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the inno-
cent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must pro-
vide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries [and land use control boards] for resolution
98. State v. Le Clair, 86 Me. 522, 531, 30 A. 7, 9 (1894) (citing Cooley, Const.
Lim. 109; Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199).
99. See supra note 39.
100. State Compensation Fund v. De La Fuente, 501 P.2d 422, 426 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972) (citation omitted).
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on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers
of arbitrary and discriminatory application. 10'
As cited in this Article, the Law Court has embraced all of these
rationale for "explicit" standards on many occasions over the last
twenty-five years. Although the above reasoning arises in the con-
text of a criminal case, the Supreme Court's analysis suggests that
the substance of the points being made extend to civil settings as
well. On this issue the Law Court has observed, "Although the
void-for-vagueness doctrine receives its commonest application in
the criminal law context, 'the doctrine has [also] been applied in in-
stances where one must conform his conduct to a civil regula-
tion.' "102 In Barnard the Law Court recognized disapprovingly that
impermissible land use objectives may be advanced under the guise
of zoning and community planning.' 03 It therefore is not surprising
that the Law Court's attack on vagueness, its fashioning of a "spe-
cific" standards requirement, was developed and fleshed out in large
part in a line of land use cases, cases cited extensively in this Article.
The critical point, however, is that whether the setting is criminal
or civil, only "meaningful," "specific," or "explicit" standards can
protect the unwary or unpopular individual, cause, or land use. No
less important is that such standards protect the fundamental princi-
ples of due process, equal protection, and separation of powers.
Without "meaningful" standards these values would be too readily
compromised by bureaucratic decision-makers looking to bar con-
struction of a dock by a boat owner from away,'0 4 or the keeping of
salvage (someone else's "junk") by a cantankerous landowner,0" or
the building of housing for prisoners in pre-release status.' 0 6
The handful of recent cases characterized in this Article as
"troubling" are so because they merely pay lip service to the idea of
standards. The standards embraced in these cases are too vague.
They have no substance. They offer no assurance that fundamental
constitutional principles will not be compromised. They open the
door to abuse, and arbitrary and capricious conduct. They will con-
tinue to sow confusion.
Lower courts and planners read between the lines of Law Court
case law. If the standards of Lentine, McCallum, Gorham, and
Emerson suffice, lower courts will ask for nothing more. Planners
101. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (first emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
102. Maine Real Estate Comm'n v. Kelby, 360 A.2d 528, 531 (Me. 1976) (citing
Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective Ass'n, 320
A.2d 247, 253 (Me. 1973) (footnote omitted)).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
104. See Lentine v. Town of St. George, 599 A.2d 76 (Me. 1991).
105. See Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A.2d 619 (Me. 1994).
106. See Pharos House v. City of Portland, CV-93-1228 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum.
Cty., Oct. 17, 1994) (Brennan, J.).
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and decision-makers will have almost "unfettered discretion" to do
what they will. Historically this has not been the law in Maine. Wa-
terville Hotel, Cope, and Wakelin prohibited such "unfettered discre-
tion" as "facially unconstitutional.' ' 10 7 As between these two lines
of reasoning the latter would seem to be a wiser choice of law.
In the final analysis only the Law Court can resolve the confusion
and make a choice. The court must recognize, however, that silence
merely prolongs the confusion and gives undue weight to Lentine,
McCallum, Gorham, and Emerson. If the present Law Court is pre-
pared to embrace the learning of its predecessors, the courts of
other jurisdictions, and the wisdom of Justice Marshall, it soon must
find a vehicle that will enable it to firmly and meaningfully rehabili-
tate Waterville Hotel, Cope, and Wakelin. Maine jurisprudence, in
particular its land use law, deserves nothing less.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
On February 5, 1996, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court handed
down its decision in Halfway House, Inc. v. City of Portland."s The
court held that the standards issues raised by the plaintiff in the case
had become moot.10 9 This decision leaves in place a municipal ordi-
nance and municipal administrative practices that are both arguably
unconstitutional. It also leaves unchallenged the trial court's disqui-
eting reliance on the Gorham opinion. 10 In short, uncertainty with
respect to whether "meaningful" standards are necessary in land use
ordinances, and what constitutes such standards, remains. The need
for the Law Court to clarify these issues is further underscored.
107. See e.g., Cope v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223, 227 (Me. 1983)
("We therefore conclude that the relevant portions ... of the Brunswick zoning
ordinance upon which the Board relied in denying the permit . . .are facially
unconstitutional.").
108. CUM-95-172 (Me. Feb. 5, 1996), vacating Pharos House v. City of Portland,
CV-93-1228 (Me. Super. CL, Cum. Cty., Oct. 17, 1994). See supra notes 69-72 and
accompanying text.
109. Id. at 1, 5. On a collateral issue, the Law Court held that the plaintiff had
standing to challenge Portland's amended zoning ordinance that barred prisoner
pre-release facilities throughout the city. let at 1, 8. The court vacated the trial
court's dismissal of this issue and remanded for further proceedings. Id.
110. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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